Can Mexico weather its next election cycle? by David M. Gould
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EXICO’S MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY is part of a world-
wide phenomenon more commonly known as production
sharing. Through the maquiladora framework, foreign
manufacturers—predominantly U.S. companies—are able
to locate labor-intensive operations in labor-abundant
Mexico, thus achieving lower labor costs in the overall 
production process. Mexico, in turn, receives investment—factories,
machinery and equipment, state-of-the-art production technology—
from countries such as the United States that have a relative abun-
dance of capital. Thus, Mexico is able to attract some of the foreign
direct investment it needs to grow.
Maquiladoras have not only become an increasingly significant
component of the Mexican economy, they are also an important part
of U.S. corporate strategy in achieving competitively priced goods in
the world marketplace. As a result, consumers worldwide reap the
benefits of maquiladora production in the form of lower-priced
goods. This article examines the importance of the maquiladora in-
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Jobs, Exports and Foreign Ex-
change. In 1998, the maquiladora in-
dustry stood at nearly 3,000 plants with
over a million workers, and growth con-
tinues strong this year. During the first
six months of 1999, plants and employ-
ment grew at 10.8 percent and 11.8 per-
cent, respectively, relative to the year-
earlier period. Table 1 summarizes the
industry’s key indicators for 1998 and the
first six months of 1999. Chart 1 shows
the industry’s principal sectors: electron-
ics, transportation equipment, and tex-
tiles and apparel. Together, these three
sectors represented over 74 percent of
maquiladora employment and nearly 80
percent of maquiladora production dur-
ing the first six months of 1999.
The maquiladora industry’s impor-
tance for the Mexican economy has been
increasing over time, especially in the
areas of job creation, exports and for-
eign exchange. Chart 2 shows the in-
dustry’s employment growth trend from
1983 through 1998. During this period,
maquiladora employment grew at an
average rate of 14.1 percent per year.
Maquiladora employment growth has
been so dynamic, especially vis-à-vis
growth in the Mexican economy, that 
its share in formal and manufacturing
employment has risen considerably.
1 In
1998, maquiladoras provided almost 8
percent of Mexico’s formal employment,
up from just over 2 percent in 1983.
They accounted for a greater share of
the country’s manufacturing employ-
ment—almost 28 percent—up from 7.2
percent in 1983. Undeniably, maquila-
doras have been very important to Mex-
ico in job creation.
As a key component of Mexico’s ex-
port platform, the maquiladora industry
also contributes to enhancing the coun-
try’s place in the world economy. Chart
3 depicts the industry’s export growth
since 1983. On an average annual basis,
maquiladora exports grew 20.4 percent
during 1983–98 and totaled almost 
$53 billion last year. During the first six
months of this year, maquiladora exports
grew 16.4 percent relative to the year-
earlier period and represented almost
46 percent of the country’s total exports
and the majority—51.1 percent—of its
manufacturing exports.
The maquiladora industry’s solid ex-
port record has placed it among Mex-
ico’s top foreign exchange generators,
affording the country a stronger posi-
tion in its external-sector accounts. As
Chart 4 shows, since the early 1980s ma-
quiladoras have been Mexico’s second-
largest source of foreign exchange, after
oil. However, in 1998, because of the
precipitous drop in the oil price—and
the maquiladora industry’s continued
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Chart 1
Maquiladora Employment 

















SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e
Informática.
Table 1
Maquiladora Industry Key Indicators
Percent change January– Percent change
1998 year ago June 1999 year ago
Plants 2,983 9.8 3,219 10.8
Employment 1,008,031 12.2 1,096,619 11.8
Total raw materials 39.1 8.8 21.3 16.1
(billions of U.S. dollars)
Imported 38.1 8.4 20.7 15.8
Domestic 1.1 28.2 .6 26.9
Value added 10.6 19.4 6.2 22.6
(billions of U.S. dollars)
Exports 52.9 17.0 29.2 16.4
(billions of U.S. dollars)
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SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática.jobs—85.4 percent—was attributable to
these companies. 
When Mexico’s maquiladora program
began in 1965, most maquiladora com-
panies were basically assembly opera-
tions requiring unskilled labor. The in-
dustry has evolved significantly over the
years to where the maquiladora factory
floor now involves much more sophisti-
cated production techniques. Concomi-
tantly, maquiladora operations have in-
creasingly required much more skilled
labor. For example, during January–
June 1999, technicians represented 12.1
percent of maquiladora employment,
compared with 8.8 percent in 1975.
Moreover, the skill level of the maquila-
doras’ largest labor component—direct
line workers
3—has been upgraded to
suit newer technologies.
Some of the highest state-of-the-art
production technology in Mexico today
is found in maquiladora companies. Re-
search and design centers are now part
of the maquiladora landscape as well. A
key example of this is the Delphi Mexi-
co Technical Center in Ciudad Juárez.
This center, which until recently was
part of the General Motors maquiladora
production infrastructure, is dedicated
to the research and design of auto parts
used by General Motors cars through-
out the world. Considered the most ad-
vanced of 27 such centers around the
world, it employs some 21,500 workers
at 15 plants in Ciudad Juárez. Opened in
April 1995, the center doubled capacity
within four years. Mexico is thus prov-
ing to be a formidable production site at
robustness last year—foreign exchange
generated through oil fell behind that of
maquiladoras for the first time, making
maquiladoras the country’s top foreign
exchange source. Last year, maquila-
doras contributed $10.3 billion in for-
eign exchange for Mexico. The figure
for the first six months of this year is 
$6 billion, signaling that maquiladora
value added at year-end will likely sur-
pass the 1998 total.
Regional and Technological De-
velopment. The maquiladora industry
has also contributed to Mexico’s re-
gional and technological development.
Maquiladoras are concentrated in Mex-
ico’s northern border states, specifically
in cities adjacent to the United States.
The two most important locations are
Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua (across from
El Paso, Texas), and Tijuana, Baja Cali-
fornia (across from San Ysidro and 
San Diego, California). Together, these
two cities represented 35 percent of
Mexico’s total maquiladora industry em-
ployment in 1998 and 39 percent of 
its maquiladora production. For all 
border cities combined, 1998 maquila-
dora employment and production shares
were 65.5 percent and 73.4 percent, 
respectively.
Before the maquiladora program’s
implementation, cities along Mexico’s
northern border had among the highest
unemployment rates in the country,
typically in double digits. Because of
the industry’s settlement in these cities
and its consistent employment growth,
these two locations now have among
the nation’s lowest unemployment rates.
Last year, the open unemployment rate
in Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana was more
than 2 percentage points below the na-
tional average (Chart 5).
2 The maquila-
dora industry has become so important
in border cities that in Ciudad Juárez,
for example, more than 57 percent of
all jobs came from maquiladora compa-
nies in 1998. Moreover, the overwhelm-
ing majority of the city’s manufacturing
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SOURCES: For the oil sector, data through 1987 are
from PEMEX; remaining oil data are from
Banco de México, Secretaría de Hacienda
y Crédito Público and Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística, Geografía e Informática.
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SOURCE: Banco de México.A case in point is the U.S. auto in-
dustry. During the mid- to late 1970s, the
U.S. auto industry faced intense compe-
tition from Japanese carmakers and, as
a result, saw its world market share fall.
In response to these developments, the
U.S. auto industry restructured to be-
come more competitive internationally,
and part of its restructuring strategy in-
volved more use of production-sharing
operations. Thus, as their maquiladora
operations grew from the early 1980s
onward, U.S. automakers were able to
regain some of the market share they
had lost and maintain a stable share
since—despite continued intense com-
petition from Asian and other foreign
carmakers.
Maquiladora production ultimately
garners the largest benefits for the U.S.
consumer—indeed, the world con-
sumer—since this strategy results in
lower-priced consumer goods than
would be the case if the goods were
produced entirely in the United States.
The price of U.S.-brand-name cars to-
day is lower because the U.S. automo-
bile industry—like the auto industry in
the rest of the world—has made exten-
sive use of production-sharing opera-
tions. If U.S. automakers were forced 
to produce cars entirely in the United
States, they would face wage rates that
in 1998 were almost $22 per hour.
Under maquiladora production-sharing
operations, they can achieve wage rates
on their labor-intensive production op-
erations of around $5 per hour. Clearly,
such cost benefits in a competitive en-
vironment have translated into lower-
priced cars for the consumer.
6
Production Sharing, U.S. Content
and U.S. Jobs. Mexico’s maquiladoras
are just one example of the production
sharing that takes place between U.S.
companies and countries throughout
the world. However, maquiladoras rep-
resent the preferred production-sharing
strategy of U.S. producers. Moreover,
given the proximity of maquiladoras to
the United States, these operations have
a high degree of U.S. content (raw ma-
terials and components originating in
the United States).
In 1997, over 36 percent of total U.S.
production-sharing imports came from
Mexico. The next highest source was
Japan, with 20 percent, followed by the
Dominican Republic, with 3.4 percent.
7
For certain products, the maquiladora
share of U.S. imports coming from Mex-
ico is almost absolute. For example,
99.7 percent of total 1997 U.S. imports
of motor vehicles from Mexico and 99.8
percent of television receivers came
from maquiladoras. Indeed, through its
maquiladora industry, Mexico is the
leading exporter of television sets to the
United States.
8
Mexico’s use of U.S. components 
relative to U.S. production-sharing op-
erations in other parts of the world is
substantial. In 1997, 58 percent of the
value of U.S. components incorporated
in worldwide production-sharing opera-
tions was derived in Mexico. In the 
case of motor vehicles, while U.S.-made
parts represented 56 percent of the
value of finished vehicles imported from
Mexico under production sharing, they
represented only 1 percent of the value
of vehicles imported from Japan and
Germany.
This high degree of U.S. content in
Mexican maquiladoras highlights, in yet
another way, the production sharing
between maquiladoras and U.S. pro-
ducers. According to the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission, 82 percent of
the materials imported by maquiladoras
and similar operations are of U.S. ori-
gin.
9 This translated into $31 billion worth
of U.S. components used by the indus-
try in 1998. Moreover, these U.S. sup-
plier industries are usually higher-tech
manufacturers that employ thousands
of high-skilled workers throughout the
United States. In fact, a 1988 survey of
maquiladora companies in Ciudad Juárez
alone showed that maquiladoras in this
city had suppliers in every U.S. state ex-
cept Hawaii.
10 Even though the nature
and importance of suppliers varied
across the different maquiladora com-
panies surveyed, there were substantial
linkages with the U.S. economy.
Thus, maquiladoras support U.S. jobs
through their extensive use of U.S. sup-
pliers. Because U.S. production-sharing
operations in East Asia are not as reliant
on U.S. suppliers as are maquiladoras,
the positive impact on U.S. employment
of these more distant operations is 
either absent or not as significant. Also,
because some U.S. companies have been
able to stay in business as a result of
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all levels of the manufacturing technol-
ogy spectrum.
The regional and technological de-
velopment that maquiladoras have
brought to the border is spreading to
Mexico’s interior as more and more
maquiladoras locate there.
4 Maquiladora
growth in the interior is helping allevi-
ate some of the physical and social 
infrastructure pressures that dynamic
growth has brought to the border cities.
However, because border growth is still
very strong, it continues to attract peo-
ple from the interior. This has created
problems for some border locations,
such as insufficient or inadequate hous-
ing for maquiladora workers. Maquila-
dora companies are now working with
the Mexican government to build ade-
quate and affordable housing for work-
ers and assist them with financing. The
first such program was launched by
Delphi Automotive in 1997. Since then,
other large maquiladora companies
have followed with similar programs.
Importance for the United States
International Competitiveness.
Maquiladoras have offered an important
investment option for U.S. companies
wanting to locate in Mexico. Since its
inception, the maquiladora program has
allowed for the duty-free importation of
materials into Mexico
5 and for 100 per-
cent foreign ownership of operations.
These features—which predated Mex-
ico’s current policy of freer foreign
trade and investment by almost three
decades—plus Mexico’s availability of
low-cost labor relative to the United States
resulted in U.S. companies creating ma-
quiladoras for their labor-intensive man-
ufacturing processes. Examples of in-
dustries that have a labor-intensive
work component are the top three ma-
quiladora production sectors mentioned
earlier: electronics, transportation equip-
ment, and textiles and apparel. By gen-
erating important labor-cost reductions
through their maquiladora operations,
U.S. companies have been able to re-
main competitive in the world market-
place and thus have retained or even
increased their world market share in
the production of goods in these and
other sectors.their maquiladora production-sharing
strategy, we can assume that without
such a strategy and unable to cope with
intense international competition, these
companies would likely have closed
and the direct U.S. jobs they now sup-
port would not exist. Hence, for all
these reasons, maquiladoras help pre-
serve U.S. jobs and generate new jobs
in the long run.
Border Development. The maquil-
adora industry’s large presence on Mex-
ico’s northern frontier has resulted in
important benefits to U.S. border cities.
Because of the maquiladora industry’s
large trade flows going through border
ports of entry, transportation and cus-
toms services and the industrial real 
estate sectors have flourished on the
U.S. side. Maquiladoras also create jobs
in the legal, accounting and financial
professions. Even the hotel, car rental
and restaurant industries in border cities
profit from maquiladoras since corpo-
rate personnel and other maquiladora
visitors usually stay and eat on the U.S.
side.
11
Beyond the service industry, however,
the U.S. border is increasingly benefit-
ing from maquiladoras in manufactur-
ing. Because maquiladora companies
use the just-in-time inventory system,
they have been urging and even requir-
ing their suppliers in the United States
and elsewhere to locate closer to them.
This has prompted maquiladora suppli-
ers to expand or even relocate their 
operations to cities like El Paso. An ex-
ample of a maquiladora supplier indus-
try that has been attracted to El Paso is
plastic-injection molding.
In 1998, there were over 50 plastic-
injection molding companies in El Paso
with some 3,700 employees. These com-
panies mostly service the maquiladora
industry across the border in Ciudad
Juárez in sectors that range from auto-
motive and computers to medical and
consumer goods. Moreover, employment
in plastics manufacturing in El Paso—
up 85 percent since 1990—is highly
skilled. From 1990 through 1998, for ex-
ample, the hourly compensation rate
paid by this sector was, on average,
21.5 percent higher than the apparel
sector, El Paso’s largest and most estab-
lished manufacturing sector.
12
For a city like El Paso, which, like
most U.S. border cities, has a high un-
employment rate relative to the nation,
its maquiladora linkages are important
to the extent that they raise the city’s
overall employment level. Also, since
the jobs that maquiladoras create in El
Paso are in the white-collar professions
or in higher-skilled manufacturing, ma-
quiladoras also work to move the city
up the economic ladder.
Conclusion
Overall, the maquiladora industry is
an important positive force behind the
growth and development of both the
Mexican and U.S. economies. It has
proved to be a consistent engine of job,
export and foreign exchange growth in
Mexico. Maquiladoras have also con-
tributed to Mexico’s regional and tech-
nological development. For the United
States, the maquiladora industry has
proved to be a vehicle by which U.S. in-
dustry has retained or even enhanced
its international competitiveness and
has resulted in lower-priced goods for
consumers. Moreover, the high degree
of U.S.-generated content in maquila-
dora operations reflects important pro-
duction and employment linkages
between maquiladoras and producers
throughout the United States. For U.S.
border cities—traditionally high-unem-
ployment locations—the presence of
maquiladoras across the border has
translated into more abundant and bet-
ter-paying jobs. Although under NAFTA
the maquiladora industry faces new
North American rules of origin for their
imported inputs in 2001, these changes
are not expected to derail the industry’s
pattern of solid growth into the next
century.
—Lucinda Vargas
Vargas is senior economist at the El Paso
Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.  Notes
A version of this paper was first presented on April 28, 1999, in 
El Paso, Texas, at an international economic forum, “A Look at the
Economies of Brazil, Mexico and El Paso del Norte,” sponsored by
the El Paso Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
1 Formal employment refers to employment registered with Instituto
Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), the Mexican social security
system.
2 The definition of open unemployment in Mexico is narrow; it is de-
rived from considering as employed anybody who may have worked
at least one hour during the unemployment survey week. However,
even when considering broader definitions of unemployment, border
cities have lower rates than the rest of the nation. For a complete list
of definitions of all the unemployment indicators used in Mexico, see
Business Frontier, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, El Paso Branch,
Issue 1, 1999, p. 5.
3 Direct labor represented 80.8 percent of total maquiladora employ-
ment during the first six months of this year. Although the majority of
these workers—56 percent—was female, this share is down con-
siderably from 78.3 percent in 1975. In fact, when looking at specific
locations, the female share has dropped even lower. For example,
during January–June 1999, Ciudad Juárez showed an almost even
split between female (50.4 percent) and male (49.6 percent) workers,
while Tijuana showed males holding a slight majority (50.7 percent)
over female workers.
4 Examples of specific cities in the interior that have witnessed im-
portant maquiladora industry growth are Hermosillo, Sonora and
Torreón, Coahuila. In the last five years, the number of maquiladora
plants in Hermosillo grew over 126 percent, and employment grew
nearly 246 percent. The corresponding figures for Torreón are 84
percent and 198 percent, respectively. Also, the state of Jalisco has
been so successful in attracting higher-tech maquiladoras, especially
in the electronics industry, that the area is now being dubbed the 
Silicon Valley of Mexico.
5 As of 2001, the North American Free Trade Agreement will impose
North American rules of origin to determine duty-free status on in-
puts imported by maquiladoras into Mexico. This action will replace
the maquiladora program’s current rule of allowing duty-free impor-
tation of inputs regardless of country of origin.
6 For a comprehensive look at the current state of the U.S. auto indus-
try, see Randall Miller, The Road Ahead for the U.S. Auto Industry,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Automotive Affairs, March
1999. Also, for information on wages in the Mexican auto industry,
see Fifth Annual Report to Congress Regarding the Impact of the
North American Free Trade Agreement upon U.S. Automotive Trade
with Mexico, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Automotive
Affairs, July 1999.
7 U.S. International Trade Commission, Production Sharing: Use of
U.S. Components and Materials in Foreign Assembly Operations,
1994–97, December 1998, p. 1-8.
8 Ibid., p. 1-6.
9 Ibid., p. 2-2.
10 See William L. Mitchell and Lucinda Vargas, “The Economic Impact
of the Maquiladora Industry in Juárez on El Paso, Texas, and Other
Sections of the United States” (Grupo Bermúdez Industrial Develop-
ers, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, 1989, photocopy).
11 Delphi Automotive, until last year a part of General Motors, has con-
ducted annual studies since 1996 on the total estimated economic
impact on El Paso of Delphi’s operations in Ciudad Juárez. In June
1998 this figure was close to $278 million. Also, the El Paso Foreign
Trade Association recently conducted a study on the economic im-
pact of Juárez’s overall maquiladora industry on El Paso. The results
will be available soon.
12 In 1990, hourly compensation rates were estimated at $6 for apparel
and $7.50 for rubber and miscellaneous plastics. In 1997, the esti-
mates were $8.60 for apparel and $11.10 for plastics. The compen-
sation differential between the two subsectors was smaller in 1998,
with apparel’s compensation rate at $10.90 and plastics at $11.40.
Affecting apparel’s much higher compensation performance in 1998
was the sector’s smaller employment base, which apparently gener-
ated higher overtime payments.
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NCE AGAIN, AMERICA is wor-
ried about its trade deficit. A
quick look at the numbers
shows why. Through June, the
red ink in goods and services
totaled $119 billion, up from
$66 billion for the first six months of
1998. The gap between imports and ex-
ports is certain to eclipse last year’s
$164.3 billion, itself a record. In the
growing trade deficit, pessimists say
they’ve found the Achilles’ heel of this
decade’s low-inflation, high-growth, low-
unemployment economy. They wonder
how the economy can be strong when
the United States keeps falling further
behind in international competition. 
Anguish about the situation wouldn’t be
complete without disaster scenarios in
which bloated trade deficits lead to a
weaker dollar, higher interest rates and
eventually a severe recession.
In recent years, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas has argued against those
who persist in finding failure amid
America’s economic success. We’ve put
into perspective concerns about layoffs,
eroding living standards and declining
real wages. When it comes to the trade
deficit, the pessimists are once again
wringing their hands and once again
wrong—not just in their predictions but
in their economic logic.
Trade deficits aren’t a sword of
Damocles hanging over America’s econ-
omy. For two decades now, the country
has prospered with merchandise trade
deficits—some in the 1980s larger than
this year’s as a percentage of GDP. Yet
our success is not a matter of luck,
which someday might run out. The U.S.
economy has grown stronger with big
trade deficits because they reflect one
of our economy’s greatest strengths—its
attractiveness to the world’s investors.
The antidote to alarm about trade
deficits lies in understanding how na-
tions track their business dealings with
each other. In international financial 
accounts, the balance of payments al-
ways balances. The dollar value of what
goes out equals what comes in, except
for minor statistical discrepancies. This
is true for a big, powerful country like
the United States, just as it is for small,
developing nations.
The statistics that show the United
States heading toward a record trade
deficit this year tell only half the story.
They show only the nation’s interna-
tional transactions in goods and ser-
vices. What’s missing are capital flows,
grown larger in recent years as nations
dismantled barriers to commerce and in-
vestors discovered the global economy.
The goods and services account shows
the United States had a deficit of $164.3
billion last year. The U.S. capital account,
however, doesn’t show a nation awash
in red ink. Quite the contrary. In 1998,
foreigners invested $502.6 billion in 
the United States and Americans sent
$292.8 billion overseas—leaving this
country with a healthy surplus of $209.8
billion (Table 1).
While comprehensive international
accounts will always sum to zero, trans-
action categories typically show sur-
pluses or deficits. For the United States,
surpluses in cross-border capital flows
offset deficits in goods and services plus
net income paid to foreigners. By the
time this year’s numbers are final, they
doubtlessly will show the same pattern.
The headline we’ve seen so often—
“America’s Trade Deficit on Record
Pace”—could just as easily read: “For-
eign Investment in America Jumps.”
Pessimists use the trade deficit to
portray the United States as weak, a 
nation losing sales and jobs to other 
nations. But the surplus in the U.S. 
capital account leads to a quite different
conclusion, one that ought to be wel-












Overall goods and services –164.3
Income from abroad 258.3
Income paid out to foreigners –270.5
Net investment income –12.2
Foreign investment in the U.S. 502.6
U.S. foreign investment –292.8
Net inflow of capital 209.8
Unilateral transfers –44.1
Statistical discrepancy 10.8
Net balance on account 0
A Commentary by W. Michael Cox and Richard AlmSavvy investors put money into
economies with the best prospects for
profit. The calculus depends on any
number of factors, but there’s no doubt
that the most important are fast growth,
stable financial markets and cutting-
edge technology. In the past two dec-
ades, no country has done a better job
than the United States of offering all three.
Over time, the net inflow of invest-
ment capital provides a mirror image of
the trade deficit (Chart 1). During the
first three decades after World War II, an
era of minimal trade and cross-border
investment, the two accounts hovered
close to balance.
In the early 1980s, that changed. For-
eign money rushed into the United States,
creating a capital-account surplus and 
a trade deficit. The timing wasn’t acci-
dental. The 1970s brought a revolution
in technology, led by the invention of
the microprocessor. Investors figured—
correctly, as it turned out—that the
United States had the entrepreneurial
fire and economic system to take ad-
vantage of the new technology.
Both the capital surplus and the
trade deficit shrank from 1988 to
1992—a time when Europe revived
with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
United States lapsed into a brief re-
cession. What was happening? Investors
shifted their funds to Europe, Russia
and the Third World. The United States
received less investment, so the hydraulics
of the balance of payments brought our
trade deficits down.
As the United States recovered and
prospects dimmed for developing na-
tions, U.S. trade deficits and capital 
surpluses once again ballooned. It’s no
secret why. Investors are buying into
the world’s most dynamic economy.
America in the 1990s has offered strong
growth, low inflation and exciting new
technologies.
Ultimately, what gets brokered on
world markets is the attractiveness of 
a nation’s business climate—its will-
ingness to embrace new technologies
and undergo the economic churn that 
is capitalism’s path to progress. Coun-
tries that endure the constant eco-
nomic makeover—in Joseph Schum-
peter’s words, “creative destruction”—
will prosper. Those that don’t, won’t.
Admittedly, it can be an unpleasant
process, full of the hardships of down-
sizing, layoffs, corporate mergers, re-
structurings and bankruptcies. Even so,
the United States has accepted the
short-term pain to reap the long-term
benefits of a system based on competi-
tion, incentives, opportunity, and free
and open markets.
The equality in international ac-
counts punctures the pessimists’ biggest
worry. They argue that trade deficits de-
stroy U.S. jobs by moving production
overseas. After all, if Americans spent
an additional $200 billion on U.S. goods,
more Americans would be working,
right? Wrong. What’s left out of their 
argument, once again, is the capital 
account and the restructuring of the
U.S. economy that it helps finance.
When foreigners invest in the United
States, they help spur growth by en-
dorsing new and stronger U.S. indus-
tries—with more and better jobs for
American workers. If it weren’t that
way, the nation’s unemployment rate
wouldn’t have fallen from nearly 10
percent in the early 1980s to just over 
4 percent today. If it weren’t that way,
real income per capita in America
wouldn’t have grown by over a third
since the early 1980s.
Americans hear too much about the
trade deficit and too little about the na-
tion’s surplus in international capital
flows. Too bad. Our ability to attract 
investment reflects the strength of the
U.S. economy and explains why trade
deficits persist at a time when nearly all
barometers of the nation’s economy are
positive.
The real problem with focusing on
the trade deficit lies in the misconcep-
tion that other countries are taking ad-
vantage of us, that Americans aren’t
getting a fair shake in the international
marketplace. This belief can lead to
foolhardy policy. It’s tempting for a 
nation fixated on red ink in trade 
to lash out at imports. Protectionism,
though, will only sap America’s eco-
nomic vitality.
The United States could generate a
trade surplus if it chose to. What’s re-
quired is a smaller surplus in interna-
tional capital flows. Making America
less attractive to investors would do the
trick. How about a severe recession? Per-
haps excessive taxation? Either way, nei-
ther Americans nor foreigners would be
eager to invest here. As a result, capital
would flow out instead of in, and Ameri-
cans would end up shipping out more
goods and services than they import.
Would anyone celebrate? We hope not.  
Cox is senior vice president and chief
economist in the Research Department 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
Alm is a business reporter for the Dallas
Morning News.
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HE U.S. ECONOMY is undergo-
ing a profound transition as the
Internet does for communica-
tion what the railroad did for
transportation in the 1800s. Just
as the railroad’s revolutionary
impact depended on building track ca-
pable of supporting fast trains across
the nation, today’s information revolu-
tion depends on upgrading the tele-
communications infrastructure to support
the new electronic commerce made pos-
sible by the Internet. The revolution’s next
step requires the network to rapidly de-
liver vast quantities of voice, data and
video—broadband Internet access.
Railroad tracks were laid across the
nation by the federal government, which
raised the necessary funds by selling
land adjacent to the tracks. Today, it’s
not the government but giant corpora-
tions that are building the nationwide
broadband tracks. And this process is
being held back not by the technology
but rather by regulations designed for
the telecom industry long before the 
Internet emerged.
Acting on industry requests and their
own desire to promote competition,
policymakers are seeking to dismantle
the regulations that prevent broad-
band’s rapid deployment. But they are
finding that old regulations die hard.
This article describes broadband, the cur-
rent regulatory environment and the high
costs of delaying broadband access.
Broadbanding the Internet
“Broadband is about to change the
Internet again and usher in an era of
electronic magic.”
1 These words by Ivan
Seidenberg, chief executive officer of
Bell Atlantic Corp., sum up the next step
in the continuing Internet revolution.
It is difficult to precisely define broad-
band, but roughly it means faster 
access to everything the Internet has to
offer. The Progress and Freedom Foun-
dation and others use “the analogy of
‘fat pipes,’ meaning vastly more digital
information can flow through them at
ever higher speeds, as opposed to nar-
rowband ‘skinny pipes’ that still make
up much of the old public switched
telephone network and work well only
for voice.”
2
Seidenberg describes broadband as
having three unique attributes: capacity,
speed and “always on.” Broadband not
only enables the Internet to offer seam-
less voice, data and video, it also changes
how people use the Internet. Imagine
surfing the Internet 100 times faster
than most modems allow, without wait-
ing to dial into any network. Imagine
talking on the phone while your spouse
conducts a stock trade and your teen-
ager watches his favorite episode of
“Seinfeld”—all through the same “pipe.”
Americans wasted an estimated 2.5 bil-
lion hours last year waiting for web pages
to download. Surveys show that house-
holds with broadband access increase
their Internet usage fourfold,
3 probably
because broadband drastically reduces
that frustrating “world wide wait.”
The Internet’s chief constraint is band-
width—and broadband lifts that con-
straint. Bandwidth used to refer to the
range of frequencies in the broadcast
spectrum occupied by a signal. In the
digital economy, bandwidth is how fast
information can be digitized, that is, re-
duced to bits of binary information
(combinations of 0s and 1s), transmitted
and then interpreted. Bandwidth is
measured in bits per second. A 28.8-
kbps modem operates at 28,800 bits per
second. Today’s broadband is available
at speeds of 3 million bits per second—
the “fat pipes” described above.
Several industries have developed
technologies to capitalize on the con-
vergence of voice, data and video. This
new competition is producing an in-
dustry convergence as well, since any
company with “pipes” now seeks to be 
consumers’ provider of choice. Long-
distance, local service and cellular phone
companies, cable television companies
and satellite operators are all position-
ing themselves to provide broadband,
but they claim telecom regulations are
standing in their way.
Ghosts of Regulations Past
The broadband industry operates
under remnants of a regulatory regime
designed for a different era, when
phone service was a government-pro-
tected monopoly. Although the 1984
court-ordered breakup of AT&T and 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
did much to encourage competition 
and improve the regulatory environ-
ment, legislative legacies continue to
distort investment incentives for broad-
band. Ironically, the methods employed
decades ago to ensure affordable local
phone service for all Americans are one
deterrent to broadband’s spread.
The first president of AT&T, Theo-
dore N. Vail, began using the term uni-
versal service in 1907 to mean the uni-
fication of local service providers into a
regulated monopoly. Universal service
gradually came to mean government 
efforts to ensure widespread access to
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Thomas M. Lenard (1999), The Digital
Economy Fact Book, 1st ed. (Washington,
D.C.:The Progress and Freedom Foundation).Over the years, long-distance rates have
been kept high to subsidize local calls
and thus provide universal service. 
Before its dismantling in 1984, AT&T
simply charged higher prices for long-
distance calls. Since then, local ex-
change carriers have levied access
charges above economic costs on com-
panies such as long-distance providers
for accessing the local networks. (See
box entitled “By Market or Mandate?”)
This system of rate subsidies is diffi-
cult to unravel. Lowering access charges
would raise local phone-service prices
and could be infeasible politically. How-
ever, failure to address the economic 
inefficiencies of this system appears to
encourage the regional Bells to invest in
each other rather than in broadband 
Internet access.
5
The Telecommunications Act of 1996
expanded the concept of universal ser-
vice to include the rapid deployment of
advanced telecommunications capabil-
ity to all Americans, such as enabling
Internet access for schools, hospitals
and rural areas. But the question re-
mains how to pay for it. The broadband
industry fears the government will im-
pose more fees that will continue to dis-
tort prices. The industry prefers new
ways of achieving affordable broad-
band for all.
6
For example, a consortium of non-
profit organizations, major corporations
and federal agencies called PowerUP
recently launched a multimillion dollar
initiative to give underserved children
access to Internet technology and guid-
ance on how to use it. PowerUP part-
ners will “provide technology, funding,
trained personnel, in-kind support and
other resources to help close the divide
between young people who have ac-
cess to computer-based information or
technology-related skills and those who
don’t.”
7
The Cost of Wrong Regulations
The regulatory legacies described
above distort investment decisions in
the new broadband technologies and
likely slow their deployment. Only 2
percent of U.S. households enjoy broad-
band Internet access today, and by
some projections broadband will only
reach 15 percent of households by 2002
(see Chart 1). Although fast by historical
standards, this pace limits the Internet’s
economic potential.
The Federal Communications Com-
mission has adopted a hands-off ap-
proach to broadband, though it is
monitoring broadband’s progress care-
fully. An October 1999 FCC report states:
“Broadband deployment in this country
is growing and will likely grow expo-
nentially in the years to come. The
rapid deployment of this technology to
consumers will depend in large meas-
ure, however, on the level of investor
interest and regulatory incentives pro-
vided to industry by local and federal
governments. One of our most signifi-
cant preliminary findings is that the Com-
mission’s policy of restraint on broad-
band regulation has helped to create a
fertile environment for growth.”
8
Fortunately, policymakers in Congress
also recognize policy flaws and are work-
ing with the FCC to prevent outdated
regulations from deterring broadband 
investment. But the clock is ticking. As
Seidenberg stated in his speech, “Inno-
vation delayed is the same as innova-
tion  denied.” The FCC delayed the
licensing of cellular telephony for
nearly two decades, costing the Ameri-
can economy over $85 billion by some
estimates.
9 It is imperative that policies
be changed not on government time,
but on Internet time.
—Meredith Walker
Walker is an economist in the Research
Department at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas.  Notes
1 Ivan Seidenberg, “The Digital Revolution and the World Economy,”
speech presented at the Progress and Freedom Foundation confer-
ence “Cyberspace and the American Dream VI,” August 23, 1999.
2 Erran Carmel, Jeffrey A. Eisenach and Thomas M. Lenard (1999),
The Digital Economy Fact Book, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: The
Progress and Freedom Foundation), p. 34.
3 Seidenberg, “The Digital Revolution and the World Economy.”
4 Thomas J. Duesterberg and Kenneth Gordon (1997), Competition
and Deregulation in Telecommunications: The Case for a New Para-
digm (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute), p. 48.
5 Wes Basel, “Another Road for Telecom Competition,” 
www.dismalscience.com, September 1, 1999.
6 Telecommunications Industry Association, Public Policy Report and
Agenda, 1999, p. 14.
7 “Major ‘Digital Divide’ Initiative Launched,” Business Wire, Novem-
ber 8, 1999.
8 Deborah A. Lathen (1999), “Broadband Today” (Staff report to chair-
man of Federal Communications Commission on Industry Monitor-
ing Sessions convened by Cable Services Bureau, October).
9 Duesterberg and Gordon, p. 5.
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By Market or Mandate?
It’s difficult to determine whether gov-
ernment regulation and the Bell monopoly
were necessary to achieve universal tele-
phone service. But some facts about the
early telephone industry raise the possibil-
ity that the market could have delivered
what the government mandated.
• The United States had local phone
service competition early this century. In
1904, dual service was available in over
60 percent of American cities with popula-
tions larger than 5,000. Almost 2,300 cities
enjoyed competition in telephone service.
The Bell System targeted large markets
with business customers; independent
companies provided service in small, rural
areas.
• Telephone service, though expen-
sive, spread rapidly before the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 established the
federal regulatory apparatus and Bell
monopoly. In 1920, one in three U.S.
households had telephone service.
• Telephone service in the United
States, which had competition in the be-
ginning, spread much more rapidly than 
in Europe, where telephone companies
were state monopolies from the start. The
United States had 10 times more phones
in service than Europe just before the 
start of World War I. Europe did not reach
the 1920 U.S. household penetration rate
until 1960.
SOURCE: Thomas J. Duesterberg and Kenneth Gordon
(1997), Competition and Deregulation in
Telecommunications: The Case for a New
Paradigm (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute), 
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SWE SWE SWE Beyond the Border Beyond the Border
VER THE LAST 25 years, Mexico
has suffered a financial crisis to-
ward the end of three of its four
presidential terms. Because prob-
lems during election years have
become so common in Mexico,
people are naturally anxious about the
potential for a crisis during next year’s
Mexican presidential election—despite
government claims that things will be
different this time. The question for
Mexico—and, of course, for Texas busi-
nesses that depend on trade with Mex-
ico—is how will the country fare
during its next election cycle?
I first review Mexico’s economic per-
formance since the 1994–95 peso crisis.
Second, I examine vulnerability indica-
tors for Mexico and compare Mexico’s
economic situation 10 months before its
next presidential election with the same
period before previous elections. Next,
I assess factors that could contribute to
a crisis in the coming year, given the
political and economic changes in Mex-
ico over the last five years. I conclude
with an assessment of the potential for
economic turbulence in Mexico through
its elections in July 2000.
The bottom line of the analysis is that
developments in Mexico since 1995, es-
pecially the adoption of a flexible ex-
change rate and better debt manage-
ment, make economic turbulence in
2000 less likely than in the past.
Recent Economic Performance
Overall, the Mexican economy has
done remarkably well during the last
four years. As shown by the bars in
Chart 1, real GDP growth averaged
more than 5 percent from 1996 to 1998.
Real GDP per capita, shown by the line,
now exceeds its level before the peso
crisis by about 4 percent. 
Although last year’s Russian crisis
stalled the economy in fourth quarter
1998, growth resumed in the first quar-
ter of this year and showed strength 
in the second quarter, growing by
nearly 8 percent at a seasonally adjusted
annual rate.
As shown in Chart 2, during the peso
crisis in early 1995 inflation rose above
100 percent at a seasonally adjusted 
annual rate but declined to less than 15
percent in 1997. Inflation moved up to
nearly 19 percent for 1998 as a whole,
largely because of a sharp peso depre-
ciation. In response to the weak peso
and inflation pressures during 1998, the
Bank of Mexico pursued a tight mone-
tary policy and has since reversed the
trend of higher inflation. Since January,
inflation has been under 16 percent.
Short-term domestic interest rates,
shown in Chart 3, had been falling since
1995 but jumped to over 40 percent in
1998 after the Russian crisis. Similarly,
the peso depreciated nearly 15 percent
against the dollar in the aftermath of
Russian financial turbulence. Domestic
interest rates started falling, and the
peso strengthened in fourth quarter
1998, although those trends were tem-
porarily reversed when the Brazilian
crisis struck in January of this year.
Despite predictions of a lingering pe-
riod of volatility, the Brazilian crisis re-
sulted in only a relatively minor setback
on Mexico’s path to recovery. Although
real GDP growth stalled in fourth quar-
ter 1998, it has shown signs of a mod-
erate recovery in the first half of 1999.
The fallout from Brazil’s devaluation
was limited in part by Mexico’s willing-
ness to raise interest rates quickly to
avoid a sharp fall in the peso and con-
sequent inflationary pressure and in part
by precautionary adjustments investors
had made during the Russian turbulence
six months earlier. 











































’99 ’98 ’97 ’96 ’95 ’94
NOTE: Seasonally adjusted annual rate, rolling three-
month average.
SOURCES: Mexican statistics; author’s calculations.
Chart 3
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SOURCE: Mexican statistics.vate sectors is maintained.
These actions cause inflationary pres-
sures and—given a highly managed
nominal exchange rate, which Mexico
has had for much of its history—lead to
appreciation of the real exchange rate.
An overvalued real exchange rate re-
flects a drop in international competi-
tiveness, resulting in reduced exports
and increased imports. This, in turn,
generates a widening current account
deficit and increases speculation of an
impending devaluation, which drains
international currency reserves as capi-
tal flees the country. Eventually, under
mounting pressures, a balance-of-pay-
ments crisis erupts and the currency is
devalued.
Vulnerability Indicators
To assess whether Mexico will fall
into another election-year crisis, I ex-
amine major vulnerability indicators and
compare their current behavior with
that during past election cycles. Vulner-
ability indicators attempt to measure an
economy’s susceptibility to crisis. I ex-
amine the following indicators: the
growth in real government expenditure,
an indicator of fiscal imbalance; the
growth in domestic credit relative to
GDP, an indicator of monetary stimulus
and inflation pressures; real exchange-
rate appreciation, a measure of how in-
ternationally competitive the country is;
and, finally, the current account balance,
an indicator of how reliant the country
As Brazil has stabilized, Mexico has
benefited from renewed capital inflow.
Mexico is expected to continue to re-
cover, but questions loom about the
country’s vulnerability to economic tur-
bulence during its 2000 election year.
The Pattern of
Mexico’s Election-Year Crises
Major devaluations and financial crises
have followed most Mexican elections
since 1976, as shown in Chart 4. In three
of the last four elections—1976, 1982
and 1994—a major devaluation and eco-
nomic crisis occurred around an elec-
tion. The 1988 election was an excep-
tion, as Mexico had not fully recovered
from its 1982 election-year crisis. In ad-
dition, the peso had depreciated earlier
under high inflation and midterm tur-
bulence following oil price declines and
the 1985 earthquake.
Why do financial crises occur in 
election years? A confluence of forces
makes the economy vulnerable to crisis.
Incumbent governments in Mexico, like
those in many other countries, have the
incentive to keep the economy growing
in an election year to attract as many
votes as possible. The more rapid the
growth, the better voters feel and the
more likely they are to vote for the in-
cumbent party. Consequently, going in-
to an election year, the government tries
to sustain or increase fiscal spending.
Monetary policy is kept loose and the
pace of lending to the public and pri-
is on foreign capital inflows to fund im-
ports of goods and services. In general,
countries with high growth in govern-
ment expenditure, rapid expansion of
domestic credit relative to GDP, over-
valued real exchange rates and large
current account deficits are susceptible
to financial crises.
Chart 5 shows the growth of real
government expenditure, which is fiscal
spending deflated by the price level.
The dashed horizontal line indicates the
average value of real government ex-
penditure over the sample period. The
circles on the plotted line mark the year
before a balance-of-payments crisis. The
average value of the growth of real gov-
ernment expenditure the year before
crisis is shown with a circle on the right
axis. As mentioned earlier, 1988 is not
classified as an election-year crisis be-
cause a major devaluation did not occur.
In the years prior to elections, fiscal
spending accelerates. On average, the
growth in real fiscal spending was 18
percent before crises. In contrast, real
fiscal spending for 1999 is projected to
increase by only about 3 percent from
1998 levels.
The increase in fiscal spending prior
to crises was usually accompanied by
an acceleration in domestic credit rela-
tive to GDP, a measure of monetary
stimulus and price pressures (Chart 6 ).
Monetary expansion was especially evi-
dent in 1982 and to a lesser degree in
1976 and 1994. On average, as shown
on the right axis, the year before crisis
domestic credit relative to GDP grew by
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about 5 percent, while so far this year it
has fallen 5 percent.
The accumulated price pressures be-
fore crises, stemming from fiscal and
monetary expansion, along with a
highly managed nominal exchange rate,
generally led to an appreciating real, 
or inflation-adjusted, exchange rate
(Chart 7 ). The real exchange rate ap-
preciates when domestic prices increase
faster than foreign prices and cause the
country to become less competitive in-
ternationally. In the year prior to crisis,
the real exchange rate was about 26
percent higher than its long-run aver-
age. Notice that in 1988, the only elec-
tion year that didn’t suffer a crisis, the
rate was below its long-run average.
Currently, the rate is only about 7 per-
cent above its long-run average.
Reflecting all these vulnerabilities, 
international trade and funding imbal-
ances generally deteriorate in the run-up
to balance-of-payments crises. As shown
in Chart 8, the average current account
deficit before crises was about 4.5 per-
cent of GDP. The deficit is now about
2.5 percent, slightly below its long-run
average but much better than during
past periods leading up to crisis.
Crisis Assessment
Mexico’s current situation appears
better than in past pre-election years,
but there is a wide variation across elec-
tion years. Moreover, history shows that
these indicators can worsen over the
ensuing 10 months. Since the 1994–95
election-year crisis, however, several key
factors have changed, suggesting that
turbulence is less likely now than in the
past. These factors include a floating 
exchange rate, which can limit real 
exchange rate overvaluation; a weak
banking sector, which is unlikely to be
a source of rapid credit expansion; 
greater political competition, which may
restrain fiscal spending; and better debt
management.
Since Mexico floated its exchange
rate in December 1994, the nominal ex-
change rate has become more volatile,
as one would expect under a floating
regime (Chart 9). At the same time, the
volatility of the real exchange rate has
declined. Increased flexibility in the
nominal exchange rate has acted as a
shock absorber to external turbulence,
permitting adjustments to changing
Chart 7
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Chart 9
Exchange Rate Volatility
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In the year prior 
to crisis, the real
exchange rate was
about 26 percent
higher than its 
long-run average.pressures rather than allowing them to
build up. Consequently, the real exchange
rate has become less overvalued and less
volatile, which has decreased the likeli-
hood of a large discrete devaluation.
Much the same happened during Mex-
ico’s period of exchange-rate flexibility
in the years before its 1988 election and
was probably an important factor in
averting a major devaluation that year.
Bank credit expansion was a source
of vulnerability in past crises, particu-
larly in 1994. Historically, the banking
sector has amplified the boom-and-bust
cycle by extending easy credit to mar-
ginal borrowers when asset prices are
high and then withdrawing that credit
when asset prices fall. In 1994, before
the peso crisis struck, expansionary bank
lending fueled unsustainable spending.
Recently, however, the banking sec-
tor is less a factor in excessive growth
simply because it has never recovered
from the peso crisis. Large corporations
still have access to international capital
markets, but individuals and small busi-
nesses are credit constrained. The level
of real bank loans outstanding has 
continued to fall since the peso crisis
(Chart 10 ), while the level of nonper-
forming loans as a share of total loans is
still relatively high, at about 15 percent.
Over the last 14 years the political
dynamics in Mexico have changed dra-
matically, with mixed implications for
the coming year. As Chart 11 shows,
Mexico has moved from a one-party
system, in which the PRI dominated the
government, to a multiparty system with
less concentrated power. As a result, the
2000 elections could give the PAN, the
conservative and second most popular
party, the best chance it has ever had to
win the presidency. The PRD, the most
liberal of the top three parties, has little
chance of winning the election by itself
and is unlikely to join a coalition with
the PAN.
As a result of greater political com-
petition, the PRI has become more ag-
gressive in producing a candidate who
can win election. In a major change
from its tradition of allowing the presi-
dent to handpick his successor, the PRI
held a primary on November 7, in
which the candidate was chosen by
popular election. This has produced a
candidate who has had to appeal to a
larger electorate than in the past. The
economic implication is that increased
political rivalry between parties may
generate pressures for more election-
year spending. However, because power
is now shared in the Congress, there are
more checks in the system, which may
limit excessive spending.
Another factor bolstering Mexico’s
stability is the shift away from reliance
on volatile portfolio capital inflows,
which is investment in the stock and
money markets, to more stable foreign
direct investment, which is property,
plants and equipment. As Chart 12 in-
dicates, portfolio investment is much
more volatile than direct investment.
Foreign direct investment has grown
relative to portfolio investment since
1997, and consequently, its importance
for funding the current account deficit
has grown as well. In the most recent
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four quarters, foreign direct investment
corresponded to 75 percent of the cur-
rent account financing needs, substan-
tially better than in previous years
before an election.
Chart 13 shows external debt service
as a share of international reserves,
which is a gauge of the ability to make
foreign debt payments should interna-
tional capital markets dry up. Mexico’s
external debt service as a share of re-
serves has fallen markedly since 1994,
to just over 160 percent in 1998. If cur-
rent levels of debt and reserves are
maintained, debt service through the
year 2000 is projected to remain below
155 percent of reserves—relatively low
by developing-country standards.
The external debt service projection
reflects the new financial package Mex-
ico announced on June 15. Mexico will
receive a $4.1 billion standby agree-
ment from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), which essentially rolls over
the remainder of Mexico’s 1995 IMF
loan until 2001. In addition, loans of
$5.2 billion from the World Bank and
$3.5 billion from the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank will allow Mexico to
ease pressures on public-sector fund-
ing. These loans, in addition to a $4 bil-
lion credit line from the U.S Export-
Import Bank, will cover nearly 80 
percent of the public sector’s expected
external debt service in 2000. The $6.8
billion swap line associated with the
North American Framework Agreement
is a potential source of assistance
should Mexico fall into crisis.
Conclusion
Mexico has repeatedly suffered bal-
ance-of-payments crises around election
years. Part of the reason was the politi-
cal incentive to stimulate the economy
to garner votes for the incumbent gov-
ernment. Excessive spending in com-
bination with a rigid exchange rate
regime and lax supervision and regula-
tion of the banking sector created un-
sustainable economic imbalances that
eventually led to balance-of-payments
crises.
While the potential for economic tur-
bulence still exists in this coming elec-
tion year, several factors have changed,
reducing the chance of a crisis similar to
those in the past. In particular, the ex-
change rate is much more flexible, which
decreases the likelihood of an overvalu-
ation and a large discrete devaluation;
the banking sector is not a source of ex-
cessive spending; and foreign debt is
more manageable. Overall, Mexico is
better positioned this year, compared
with previous election cycles, to weather
most storms on the horizon.
—David M. Gould
Gould, former senior economist and 
policy advisor in the Research Department
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, is
now a senior economist at the Institute of
International Finance in Washington, D.C.
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on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
July–September 1999
Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1996 = 100
Texas Employment
Index, January 1998 = 100
Index, January 1998 = 100
Texas Construction Contract Values Index
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SWE SWE SWE Regional Update Regional Update
HE TEXAS ECONOMY grew strongly in the third quar-
ter, with employment increasing at a 3.4 percent annu-
alized rate after rising at a 1.6 percent annual rate in
the first half. A strong service-producing sector, a sta-
ble energy industry and steady growth in the construc-
tion sector have all boosted the regional economy.
Employment in service-producing industries increased at
an annualized 4.6 percent rate in September. The distribution,
business services and FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate)
sectors showed especially robust growth. The strong national
economy continues to fuel the distribution sector. Employ-
ment growth in temporary worker services (a subsector of
business services) was very high, with demand coming mainly
from the high-tech and energy industries.
Higher oil prices have helped lift the energy industry out of
the doldrums. The oil and gas extraction industry gained jobs
in September for the third month in a row. The rig count,
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI† Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
9/99 125.0 127.4 145.9 533.4 1,094.2 1,545.6 5,909.3 9,228.4 1,909.5 730.4
8/99 124.9 126.8 145.7 531.8 1,095.2 1,537.9 5,889.4 9,200.0 1,906.7 730.7
7/99 125.3 126.4 145.1 529.0 1,095.8 1,524.4 5,873.2 9,167.5 1,906.7 730.2
6/99 124.2 125.2 144.9 526.5 1,093.6 1,524.4 5,862.1 9,151.5 1,909.2 729.8
5/99 123.3 125.9 145.6 525.7 1,093.4 1,524.7 5,837.4 9,126.8 1,905.2 730.0
4/99 123.7 125.5 147.3 527.2 1,094.4 1,522.8 5,819.9 9,111.6 1,905.1 731.5
3/99 121.9 126.5 150.4 522.7 1,096.1 1,522.7 5,804.6 9,096.5 1,896.9 730.0
2/99 121.8 127.2 151.9 521.0 1,097.0 1,520.8 5,783.2 9,073.9 1,897.8 727.6
1/99 122.0 127.2 153.8 517.6 1,098.4 1,521.2 5,763.5 9,054.5 1,897.6 729.0
12/98 121.3 127.6 159.2 514.5 1,106.9 1,518.8 5,778.6 9,078.0 1,903.5 724.4
11/98 120.7 128.3 160.0 508.6 1,106.2 1,510.6 5,748.0 9,033.4 1,899.6 724.1
10/98 122.3 128.6 162.0 506.4 1,109.2 1,506.6 5,726.5 9,010.7 1,895.3 722.7
* in thousands
† Texas Industrial Production Index
 
which has been on the upswing for the past six months, in-
creased by another 12 rigs in October. While producers are
more active, they are unwilling to undertake expensive or
risky projects. The increased drilling remains shallow, vertical
and land-based.
Employment growth in the construction sector is steady,
but construction contract values have flattened, cooling from
very high levels. Falling residential and nonresidential con-
tract values are bringing the total down, while nonbuilding
construction (roads) is providing the strength needed to keep
statewide construction on an even keel. Construction em-
ployment grew at a 5.3 percent annualized rate in the third
quarter but only 3.7 percent in September, possibly signaling
a slowing of growth but also reflecting a continuing tight
labor market.
—Mine Yücel
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